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Abstract: Within western political culture an increasing emphasis has been placed on the 
anesthetization of life. One of the victims to this change is people with disability. People with 
disability now recognize a shift in political attitude. While change in “look” and “posture” earlier were 
tolerated as part of a human register of appearance, a shift of lifestyles and fashioned icons of beauty 
coupled with a logic of how citizens ought to be given status frame disability into a negative 
aesthetics of appearance. Since aesthetics and political discourse become more closely related and 
form presupposition for “aesthetic citizenship”, there is a need to think in new ways of how to 
contribute to a liberation from this kind of political suppression.  From the perspective of the need for 
a social repair (Arendt), my contribution will first discuss how the politics of appearance frames 
disability negatively. Through considering the contributions of Rancière, Merléau-Ponty, Sartre, and 
Kearney I show how an understanding of disability reduced to a merely `negative ontology, can be 
contrasted with a philosophy of the negative that takes the negative as embodied possibility. In the 
last part of the essay I consider how the philosophy of negativity can change how we “judge” 
disability.                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Keywords:  disability –political discourse, embodiment, negative possibility, phenomenology, the 
sacred.  
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     1.0  Introduction: The need for a religious critique of the politics of appearance. 
       Within western culture an increasing emphasis has been placed on the de-
traditionalizing and aestheticisation of life. 
1
Some of the victims of this change are people 
with disabilities. People with disabilities now recognize a shift in attitude. While deformity 
and change in “look” and “posture”, in western culture could be tolerated as part of a 
human register of appearance, a dramatic shift of lifestyles and fashioned icons of beauty, 
coupled with a logic of how citizens ought to be given full status as citizens now frame 
disability into a negative aesthetics of appearance. 
2
 People with disabilities often experience 
themselves takes as freaks, deviants, or even monstrous in appearance to the “normal” 
citizen. 
3
  To avoid stigma and marginalization we need to develop a more critical reflection 
of how the politic of appearance functions. Curiously, we now have only small resources to 
help us consider what is genuinely harmful or positive in how political culture discern 
between images of appearance. Since aesthetics and politics become closely related there is 
a need to think in new ways of how to contribute to a liberation of people with disabilities.  
       According to Rancière, known for his recent critique of the politics of aesthetics, politics 
will play itself out in the paradigm of relationship between stage and audience, a discourse 
of presence and a symbolic figuration of collective legends.
4
 The political myths will favor 
some forms of presence as more desirable, produce “canonical forms”, law on kinship, while 
others are considered as transgressive and monstrous forms.
5
 Rancière also mentions how a 
demonstration of consensus, presumes a connection between images of able-bodied 
citizenry, and meaning produced of agentive and attractive bodies. Having a particular 
occupation determines the ability to take charge of what is common to the community. 
Aristotle stated that a citizen is someone who has a part in the act of governing and being 
governed.
 6
 Some bodily forms turn out to be prejudicially linked to a certain favor of how 
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real citizens look and act by their capacities, while others are considered less representative.  
So, if we take secular politics to revolve around what is seen and what can be said about it, 
around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, the government of the strongest.
7
 
people with disabilities will mostly fall short of being included in such a description. If having 
a particular occupation determines the possibility to take charge of the common, people 
with disability will often be negatively charged, and fall below the level of ability required to 
be considered as normal citizens. Though people with disabilities are not one group they are 
often considered as not possessing the abilities to take part in governance. In history, in  
literature and drama, they are burdens, heterogenous organisms, freaks, that conform to 
the norms of monstrosity and defilement rather than being acknowledged as humans that 
contribute to citizenry. 
8
 As the political also becomes mutual with the aesthetic mirrored by 
regard of fulfillment of desires, screened in media and information culture, citizenry 
becomes utterly charged with the morality of individual actualizations.
9
 When we take into 
consideration how actualization in aesthetic post-modernity is almost equal to this charge of 
the political possible, disability cannot be anything than the ontological negative possibility.     
       According to Hanna Arendt, one of the tools to achieve repair of the predicaments that 
frame marginalized people into a negative ontology is to do a conceptual work on 
`wordliness´ and `facticity´ and reframe.  New narration can entail the character of a 
therapeutic setting that liberates. To Arendt this also puts appearance at the centre of 
interest.  Aesthetic taste and political opinion are related because they are concerned with 
judging the particular according to its appearance rather than purpose.
10
 Political judgment 
involves representation through images and equally important, the use of phenomenology.
11
  
                                                           
7
 Ibid. p.13; ———, Hatred of Democracy.P.44 
8
  Henri-Jacques Stiker, A History of Disability (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). C. Barnes, 
"Theories of Disability and the Origins of the Oppression of Disabld People in Western Society," in Disability and 
Society:Emerging Issues and Insights, ed. L. Barton (London: Longman, 1996). Cf. also  the new literature on  
media framing of disability;Charles A. Riley II, Disability & the Media Prescriptions for Change (Lebanon, New 
England: University Press of New England, 2005). 
9
 Rancière, Hatred of Democracy. P.1.   
10
 Confer  Shaap Andrew Schaap, Political Reconciliation, Routledge Innovations in Political Theory (Abingdon, 
New York: Routledge, 2005). P. 69 Ref. to Arendt Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in 
Political Thought (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).P.221,Ernst Volrath, "Hanna Arendt and the Method of 
Political Thinking," Social Research 44, no. 1 (1977). P. 182, Ronald  Beiner, "Interpretive Essay:; Hannah Arendt 
on Judging," in Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. R. Beiner (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982).P.111 
11
 Hannah Arendt, "Lecture's on Kant's Political Philosophy," in Hanna Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political 
Philosophy, ed. R. Beiner (Brighton: Harvester Press,, 1982). P.69 
 Disability, appearance, politics : a comment from theology.  3
        With the insight that a peculiar dualism of aesthetic citizenry and negativity ontology of 
possibility is a core phenomenon of the framing of disability this essay will try reframe 
disability by discussing `possibility´. My aim is not to discuss the politics of appearance in a 
broad perspective, but to let the perspective of repair guide us.  As it will be clear in section 
3.0. , critical reflexivity will work best in a dialogue between a religious understanding and a 
secularist. Since theology has a tradition in handling `appearance´ and relate it to 
phenomenology, we will try to let a different perspective supplement the present dominant 
views (above). Theology has the capacity to move in-between the philosophy of religion, 
anthropology, ethics and phenomenology and supplement discourses. 
                           2.0.   Disability, secular  appearance and the script of inability.  
            Linguistically an `appearance´ is the sensory or phenomenal aspect of the act, state, 
condition, manner or style, in which a person or object manifests itself before a public. More 
archaic, an appearance can mean an apparition, epiphany, or advent in time and space of 
any psychic or bodily character. Yet, we can also frame appearances into absences, 
privations and negations of what we take as a possible and pleasant appearance. Central in 
our discussion is how appearances are negotiated. As Arendt says, appearances are judged 
by politics.
12
 Appearances can be what political culture conveys to discern between the 
worldly, the factual, fiction and the unreal by the use of imagination.  For the reason that 
there exists reflexivity (Arendt), we have the possibility to disrupt the dominant discourses, 
and to invoke a reflexive discourse of appearances.  
       Hence, the politics of appearance is nothing but the realization of the construction of 
political judgment in the intermediary between the political discourses of the real, 
authenticity, fiction and critical reflexivity.  If the politics of appearance exists in this 
intermediary, politics can achieve closures of phenomenology and it can open it. Hence, the 
distribution of political phenomenology of the visible and the invisible, that simultaneously 
determines the stage of politics as a form of experience, becomes one of its centers. 
13
 There 
is now time to let phenomenology deliver the arguments.  
           If we take disability in post-modernity as variedly framed by a discourse of the living, 
experience  and possibility, where “the political” regards not only participation, but the 
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fulfillment of actualizations, we must ask more to the point of what this does to the 
interpretation of disability. In recent philosophy `possibility´ is not necessary equal to the 
actual. There is a possibility to think absences and negativities within `possibility´. Only when 
possibility is regarded as equal to its actualization and realization, will negative possibility 
retains a negative social ontology.  By terming people with disabilities as tragedy of 
actualizations, they retain the dualistic framework of possibility. This is the path I challenge.  
       As known to many, Husserl was the one that provided phenomenology to disrupt the 
modernist metaphysics of actualizations and to introduce a new reflexivity of lived life.  In his 
authorship a phenomenon is equal to an “appearance”. 
14
 This is also so in the work of 
Maurice Merléau-Ponty and Richard Kearney.  The stance that Arendt took was partly 
provided by Husserlian phenomenology. These authors show a genealogy of reframing of 
appearances aimed to heal modernity from its dysfunctional oppressive ontology.  
       In my opinion, a decisive achievement is how Merléau-Ponty applied the term `lived 
body´ to offer an alternative mode of describing human possibility, draw worldliness  and 
facticity nearer and strike a death-blow to a dualism of possibility.
15
 While the body in 
western tradition is usually taken as “tomb, temple or machine 
16
, or, more modern are 
considered as corpses, to be rewarded, used, punished, or controlled
17
 , there is also 
embodiment. For Merléau-Ponty, embodiment retains the full structure of the world that I 
live through the body. The retrieval of this dimension, made it possible to formulate a critical 
theory of society, and reframe our modernist ontology.
18
   
        Being a contemporary friend of Jean-Paul Sartre, that started the battle of appearances, 
Merléau-Ponty and Sartre shared some vocabulary and would refer to “mere appearances” 
(Merléau-Ponty) or “flat appearances” (Sartre)
 19
, as terms for the way we abstract the lived 
body into a lesser body. Yet,  while Sartre discusses appearance by how we negates the 
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world to achieve a subjectivated world, seeing the world as a necessary produced 
“nothingness”, Merléau-Ponty saw  the field of the negated not as “nothing”, or “empty”, 
but entailing a bodily primordiality that structures the world with us in it.
20
  In opposition to 
an abstract discourse that takes error, sickness, madness as naked appearances that 
separate us from culture, embodiment makes the world structure come to the core of 
consciousness such that human culture originates in it.
21
 To describe the political in full and 
our relations in public, we need the phenomenology of the lived body. We can understand 
the political as the free assembly of yet, unfulfilled bodies.
22
 Hence, he could achieve a 
different notion of that which we usually negate.  His distinction is of great relevance. For 
Merléau-Ponty that which is negated, taken as a negative possibility, is not a strict gap or 
hole in being, but a “void”, a negativity that paradoxically is a `texture´. 
23
 
          In my opinion, his criticism touches hard on the problem we address.  If one omits 
embodiments for `corpse´, abilities become easily related to a fictional discourse of the real 
that sets loose from the facticity of how the world is structured. With the structure of 
negative structure (above) forgotten and left behind, discourse can abstract abilities from 
corporeal frailty being and construct subjects ideally as the sole and able containers of their 
own acts. Rather than being a void where sickness, impairment and madness is part of 
facticity’s structure, corpses, can be seen as supply of abilities to be authenticated in 
introspection, or rituals of inclusion.  However, if we proceed from `embodiment´ and not 
from `corpse´, the world can be seen as to imposes its structures and rhythms on us in a far 
more complicated and sophisticated manner.    
          To explain this, we should note how there are aspect of negativity we entrust not to be 
below the level of ability.  The phenomena of birth, pregnancy, infancy, even disease, 
madness, retardation, can be implemented into `negative possibility´, but they are not to 
equate with negative ontology.  A person who cannot see or walk is not a disabled person, 
but will perform a negativity that lay in wait to be realized and be effective by an other(ly) 
relation outside him/herself.  According to the criticism of disability studies it is the frame- 
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work of restrictions ranging from individual prejudice to institutinnal discrimination that 
makes us see others as unable to take charge of what is common to the community.
24
 
People with disabilities do not experience themselves as unable citizens. The framing of 
disability into an appearance of not-able- bodies is ontologically false. If we take Merléau-
Ponty’ criticism as analogous to the critique of the negative framing of disability in political 
culture, negative possibility, is not dualistic to possibility, but is part of the world’s structure. 
        How can it be that nothingness in modernity is made totally empty?  As mentioned 
above, Sartre saw the impasses of the modern discourse that conflated body with corpse.  
To Sartre, one of the reasons for why the body becomes negated is secularization. Sartre 
first considered this as a progress, but saw also the dysfunctions and losses it provoked.
25
 
The political taxonomies that take possibility as equal to its actualizations, easily occupy the 
place of religion.
 
When how the structure of the lived body falls apart for the sacred, we feel 
a loss of humanity.  For this reason he sought to find repairs, but was soon cast into aporias.   
        According to Sartre, the body of mine makes its appearance, negatively, and only 
subsequently to the encounter with ´the other´.
26
 `The other´ is ontologically prior to the 
appearance of  any ontological dimension of the body. 
27
 Sartre states:  “If the essence of the 
appearance is an “appearing” (un paraitre), which is no longer opposed to any being, there is a 
legitimate problem of the being of this appearing”….so that this “being of the phenomenon, cannot 
itself be the phenomenon of being”.
28  If one by the essence of an appearance means 
`substantia´, Sartre says, it itself would never appear. All one can say is that its being is: “It 
is”. Its only manner is to be”. 
29
  In Sartre’s terminology the phenomenon of being is 
transphenomenal and more fundamental than knowledge. The being of the appearing 
cannot be identical with the appearing itself. Hence, appearances themselves speak of an 
other reality available.
30
 Sartre is of the opinion that consciousness of a phenomenon 
encounters a being which it is not, but other, so that possibility rests on our passivity. Cit: 
The chock of the encounter with the Other is a revelation in emptiness of the existence of my 
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body,…..” 
31
  Sartre comes in these passages to see possibility as relative to an anonymous 
emptiness (void, my addition) that awaits an Other. Sartre does not frame `body´ into a self-
contained ability, but sees `actualization´ as preceded by `negative possibility´(my notion).    
          However, in his most insistent chapters, Sartre can say that no-being is a product of 
human subjectivation of being.  When we consider a blind to lack sight, it is by operation of 
construction.  No-being does not exist, it is not a gap of being, but a product of culture.
32
  
According to the critique of Sedan, the aporia of Sartre’s argumentation, is double: “he reifies 
non-being, claiming that it is, and second, he identifies it with “human consciousness itself.…”.
33  That 
is why his attempt failed.   A question that remains unanswered is the relation to religion 
and the Other.  Could we, from Merléau-Ponty and Sartre, proceed  to think the void, the 
texture, that is not empty, in a theological key? This is what Richard Kearney tries to do.  
                3.0. Richard Kearney’s  civilizatory discourse of appearances – a new politics. 
        For Kearney, religion has the prerogative of making appearances into a device for 
thinking possibility and therefore also anthropology. Kearney knew Sartre, Merleau-Ponty 
and worked in their environment, but came through Ricoeur, proponent of religion and 
theology to consider appearances through a religious phenomenology. First: There is the 
Other that refuses to be framed into analogies of any appearance and disrupts our dreams 
of negating her/him.  Second: The other is not absolutely other and distant, but intervenes in 
a relation and can be half-way conceived by analogous imagination. Third: By a dialogical 
criticism that traverses between otherness and the discourse of the sacred as manifest in the 
often neglected everyday appearances, we can retrieve a phenomenology of possibility that 
is not oppressively dualistic to marginalized persons or groups.     
       To understand the depth of this position we must take into consideration how 
postmodern theology makes a new critique of how “orthodox theologies” have imagined 
God.  Classic Western theologies often attributed to God a specific essence (substantia), 
conflating with the political form, and came to betray the other placed at “society’s” 
underside. The primordiality of appearances became subordinated to an explananatory 
discourse of God as the beautiful perfect self-actualizing power.  As God is the emblem of 
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self-contained able perfection, the political doxa that comes to characterize citizenry 
surrenders disability to the metaphysics of inability. Hence, in recent theology there is a 
sharp division  between theologies that put God as emblem of actualized self-empowered 
possibility and theologies that see God as ineffable, weak,  kenotic,  and empting his power 
into the world by a desire for carnal relation.
34
 Thus, the use of negation, expresses the 
process of finding a way to prevent theology from becoming one more flattened texpression 
of the finite. The discourse of kenosis, the emptying of own powers, divine and human, is 
aimed to avoid “ a polarizing of inaccessible divine substance and manifest persons.”
35
 New 
theology tries to omit the discourse of divine analogy that conflates God with the ideology of 
the self-actualized perfect, with other frames and scripts. Sartre’s argument (above) that 
appearances cannot proceed from `substantia´ can be considered as a supplement to this 
critique. But for the same reason he did not see the resource that religion might supply.   
       To Kearney, what is absent from the discourse that makes God into an emblem of 
political power and perfection, is the notion of God turned towards us through the weak and 
vulnerable.  In Kearney’s philosophy of religion, the sacred appears in everyday epiphanies, 
in faces or facial relations, so that God becomes a primordial event beneath us, asking for 
help, but also transfiguring us. Hence, we must interpret negative possibility otherwise.  
       To explain this position, we must recall how Nicolaus Cusanus, an author that Kearney 
relates to, applied the noun and verb “posse” (n. `possibility´ v. `to be able´) in combination 
with `esse´ (lat.: to be), to create the theological neologism `possest´ to frame  `possibility´.
36
 
To Cusanus, God is infinite in the sense of being the actualization of all possibility, yet is 
`ineffable´ as such. Cusanus combined a thinking of the sacred in everyday life, with a vision 
of actuality where God appears in the plural possibilities of existence. This is combined with 
an affirmation of religion as universal phenomenon that gives a practical wisdom of 
embodied life. The central notion of Cusanus is how `posse´ is placed above the god of esse 
or substance (actuality). Possibility exists eternally within God and since it is prior to its 
actuality, God, as `possest´ is “everything” which is able to be.
37
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          For Kearney, if we supply this original thinking, with the thinking of how God empties 
himself in a kenotic movement, we can give a different interpretation of `possibility´. Making 
a slight twist to Cusanus’ theology, Kearney reads the saying, in Ex. 3.14, in a different key. 
While “orthodox theology”, often reads it in a substantial way, as “Ego to on”, (Gr : “I am 
Being itself”), and so the guarantee of every terror of actualized analogy  that we idolize, 
Kearney omits the reading to mean:  “I am who is able to be”. 
38
 With eschatological 
possibility separated from its present actualizations the way is open for thinking negative 
possibility, kenotic movement, and the primordiality of embodied existence together. With 
negative possibility as the primordial relation, God can be thought of as that which calls and 
summons us from the seemingly empty places of the least and the vulnerable; Cit:  The 
divine always comes and summons through the face of the most vulnerable, in the cry of the 
smallest of these, so that God become dependent on our help and care to transfigure 
others.
39
 Ethically, the summoning power of God is an occurrence that is primordial to being 
and anything that is and becomes valued to be an actualized appearance.  Following 
Cusanus’ original intention, Kearney is of the opinion, that the religions entail a wisdom of 
embodied life as the negative space for the sacred to appear in. Like Merléau-Ponty’s notion 
of the political ,` community´ is the embodied relations that exceeds nationhood. 
40
 For 
Kearney, religion is emphatic of a politic  organized around embodiment as an unfulfilled 
reality and inter-subjective mode of experience that structures a practical wisdom.  
       To cope with the admonition that the discourse of the sacred is only strictly religious, 
Kearney takes an argument from Merléau-Ponty.  While the phenomenologist regularly is 
interpreted as an agnostic, Kearney shows how Merléau-Ponty could affirm this religious 
language of kenosis, eucharist communion and everyday phenomenology in a strictly 
agnostic manner. From a philosophical viewpoint the phenomenologist offers an intriguing 
interpretation of Eucharistic embodiment as recovery of the Divine within flesh. He quotes 
Merléau-Ponty to say: “There is a sort of impotence of God without us, and Christ attests that God 
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is not above, but beneath us, meaning that we do not find him as a suprasensible idea, but as another 
ourself, which dwells in and authenticates our darkness…”
41
  
           Surprisingly, he also quotes Sartre to have seen a conflict between his atheist 
understanding of appearances and his friend’s, Merléau-Ponty’s. The quotation signals how 
Sartre may have acknowledged the incongruency  between taking`being´ as not containing 
its own being and subjectivation as a power that negates our being.
42
 Kearney quotes Sartre 
to say:  “Didn’t Merléau- from time to time, think he perceived some sort of transcendent mandata 
“hidden in immanence” within us. He congratulates a mystic for having written that God is below us, 
,,, He dreamed of this almighty that would need men…Everything is there: the discovery and risk of 
being below us, a gigantic beggar woman clad in rags, we need only an imperceptible change for her 
to become our task: God, the task of man.” 
43
 
4.o. Disability, social repair, the politics of appearance. 
        To me, this argumentation is neatly fit for a project of social repair.  In distinction to a 
framing of appearance that takes the ensemble of citizens as constructed through the 
actualization of beauty and able bodies, we have a choice.  With possibility relieved from 
actualization, possibility floats free from the “is’s  of being and what we normally 
acknowledge as to “take charge of the common”(Rancière).  With God being a tacit power 
beneath us asking for our care and transfiguration of the other, the other draws nearer in 
facticity so that our political future depends on how we relate. Here, embodiment entails the 
meaning of an unavoidable facticity and is both a sacramental texture and the empty space 
that none is privileged to occupy.  By how possibility dwells in each instant as “a may be”, no 
matter how lowly, religious, or profane, the framework to conceive of disability and to 
conceive of a politics of appearance is radically changed.   If negative possibility entails a 
“may be”, for us all, and primordial embodiment not at first established corpses self-
contained with possibility, disability will not fall under the level of ability. With `posse´ 
placed before any actuality, and intrinsic to negative possibility, any way of  taking possibility 
as equal to its political actualization, will  impoverish political culture. 
44
 Ability is not a 
property of persons or bodies, more for some than for others, but is first to be rendered as 
                                                           
41
 ———, "Merleau-Ponty and the Sacramentality of the Flesh," in Merleau-Ponty at the Limits of Art, Religion 
and Perception, ed. Kascha;DeRoo Semonovitch, Neal (Londion,New York: Continuum, 2010). Cit. P. 155.   
42
 Cf the above meaning of Sartre page    this essay. 
43
 Kearney, "Merleau-Ponty and the Sacramentality of the Flesh." Cit. P.158 
44
  de 
 Disability, appearance, politics : a comment from theology.  11
negative, awaiting to be realized as `a may be´, as Kearney says. Democracy is not the 
ensemble of self-contained agents, participating for letting their desires be fulfilled.  Rather, 
by how “the may be” is actualized in multiple forms, ability can appear in what form 
whatsoever, what we can possibly imagine, and beyond it.  Or to quote Cusanus: “In Him not-
being is everything which is possible to be. And so, He creates not from any Other, but from Himself; 
for He is everything which is possible to be.”
45
  
       This is to suggest a new definition of the political. If we take negative possibility as the 
primordial ontological situation, the `conditio humana´, that politics relate to, we can 
propose democracy to be that empty place in culture nobody is privileged to occupy. If the 
divine proposes ability to become actual in whatever possible form, the divine does not 
favor a beauty, one notion of possibility, to be stated against what one takes as freak, ugly, 
sublime or monstrous. For God there is not monstrosity or deformity. For God there are 
empty places, non-justice, non-grace waiting to be filled with self-emptying, powerless, 
kenotic and carnal love, by giving a space for it.  
        By first recognizing our powerlessness, vulnerability, brokenness we find ourselves 
summoned to recognize God in whatever possible structure of the world that materializes 
before us, appears, inconclusive of sickness, madness, impairment, all the frailty 
weaknesses, so that we continuously have to reconsider practices.  We have to let the 
vocabulary of distinction of social differences and fragmentation, privileges and misfortune 
be tested and re-conceptualized a thousand times.  The personification of appearances as 
inscribed into a political (and religious) field is only possible to grasp through innovative 
imagination that confronts appearances negated to conform with political idolization of  the 
beautiful able or whatever we try to fit into our notion of how others should appear and 
charge the political.  It is the task of political culture, the stage, to comprise so many thought 
experiments as possible. Democracy is a place for human appearances to “may be”, manifest 
in the yet indefinite, become being in time and space.  And “to let be”, we must see persons 
through the mirror of the sacred, not only in the religious “form”, but by a phenomenology 
that takes the eschatological structure, the plurality of the not yet, of wordliness into us. As 
Arendt implied, political judgment is best when it is mostly mundane and takes the plurality 
of wordly facticity into its judgments. If God is kenotic immanent, the wordly, or profane, is 
not that area emptied of sacred texture, but is the place where subdued selves and non-
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realized “may-be” becomes the textured ` void´, the political point of departure, for charging 
political possibility as such. Hence, to dissolve orthodoxies of appearance and to retrieve the 
different voices subdued under a too biased politics of appearances, religion is an 
indispensable part of the postmodern politics of repair.  
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